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Abstract 
The Logit version of Quantal Response Equilibrium predicts that equilibrium behav­
ior in games will vary systematically with payoff magnitudes, if all other factors are held 
constant (including the Nash equilibria of the game). We· explore this in the context 
of a set of asymmetric 2x2 games with unique totally mixed strategy equilibria. The 
data provide little support for the payoff magnitude predictions of the Logit Equilibrium 
model. \Ne extend the theoretical Quantal Response Equilibrium model to allow for het­
erogeneity, and find that the data fit the heterogeneous version of the theory significantly 
better. 
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· 1 Introduction 
. Iviost research in experimental economics relies implicitly on an assumption that marginal 
payoff incentives in the experimental environment are sufficiently great to successfully 
induce preferences and thereby provide a good approximation of the theoretical economic 
environment being studied. On the other hand, it has been argued that there are other 
behavioral components that may contaminate experiments where incentives are not high 
enough 1. This contamination, it is argued, generally takes either the form of "random 
noise" in the data or the form of systematic departures due to other competing and un­
controlled incentives such as social utility. Until recently, there has been no satisfactory 
predictive model to apply to this issue of payoff magnitude. There has been some suc­
cess accounting for deviations from standard theory by appealing to random noise and 
social utility, and these accounts are often qualitatively consistent with payoff magnitude 
explanations. 2 There have also been experimental studies of payoff magnitude effects 
in both economics and psychology3 , but very few game theory experiments have been 
designed and run to test and calibrate specific quantitative ·models of payoff magnitude 
effects. 
Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) [IvicKelvey and Palfrey (1995) ] provides a 
model that makes specific predictions about how equilibrium behavior in games should 
change in response to payoff magnitudes. According to this theory, there are two effects 
of increased payoff magnitude in games. The first effect is direct, and is present in many 
models of payoff magnitude borrowed from the stochastic choice literature: increasing 
the magnitude of incentives 1-vill reduce decision errors by subjects. They will make opti­
mal choices with greater frequency. The second effect is an indirect general equilibrium 
effect. In strategic situations the decision errors of one subject will affect the payoffs of 
the other subject. This in turn will affect the choice frequencies of that subject which 
1See for example Harrison (1989). 
2See, for example, :tvicKelvey and Palfrey (1992), Palfrey and Prisbrey (1997), and Cooper, DeJong, 
Forsythe, and Ross (1996). 
3See Grether and Plott (1979) and Siegel (1961). 
then feed back on the original subject. An equilibrium with these decision errors is a 
quantal response equilibrium. Thus changes in payoff magnitudes can change the quan­
tal response equilibrium of the game, even if there is no change in the standard (Nash) 
equilibrium of the game. 
This paper presents the results from an experiment, using a collection of very simple 
2 x 2 games of complete information, similar to those originally studied by Ochs (1995) . 
The games we concentrate on in our study are interesting in that they all possess the 
same unique mixed strategy Nash equilibrium for either one or both players. This is 
due to the fact that they only differ in payoff magnitude, a difference to which the Nash 
equilibrium concept is insensitive. On the other hand, the Logit version of QRE makes 
different predictions for the different games. Maximum likelihood estimates are used to 
_ test between these equilibrium notions, random play, and a model which looks at a hy­
brid between Nash equilibrium and random play, which we call Noisy Nash Equilibrium 
(NNE) . \"!Ve find problems with all of these models, but find that QRE fits the data best. 
vVe conjecture that one of the problems in fitting the data is that these models assume 
that all agents have identical error rates, or rationality parameters. In nearly all attempts 
to carefully measure subject heterogeneity in economics an� game theory experiments, 
significant and potentially important sources of heterogeneity have been found4. In the 
last section, we develop a heterogeneous extension of the Logit QRE model. We find 
that this heterogeneous subject model generates substantially different predictions and 
produces a significant improvement in fit. 
2 Payoff Magnitude Effects and Quantal Response 
Equilibria 
The Quantal Response model incorporates error into the best response of players in a 
game. Thus, the perfectly rational model of choice usually assumed to govern players' 
actions is replaced by a probabilistic one where better responses are more likely to be 
played, but no action is played with certainty. 
The logistic specification of the QRE, \\'hich we use here, measures error in terms of 
a precision parameter, A, which is inversely related to the variance of the error.5 If the 
expected utility to strategy j for agent i is denoted by Uij then the probability that i will 
4See, for example, Cox, Smith, and \Yalker (1983), El-Gamal and Qrether (1995), Palfrey and Pris­
brey (1997), and Stahl and Wilson (1995). Vlhile these papers investigate different possible sources of 
heterogeneity than the one we look at here, in all cases the heterogeneous models significantly outperform 
the homogeneous models. 
5For a formal and more detailed explanation of QRE, see McKelvey and Palfrey (1995, 1996, 1998). 
Those papers also provide discussion about the conceptual interpretation of,\. 
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use strategy j is given by the logit formula: 
eAUij 
Pij = Lk e>-u;k ' 
where k runs over the available strategies for agent i. If ,\ = 0, then players are acting 
entirely in error (i.e. completely unresponsive to payoffs) , while for ,\ = oo, players' 
actions are equivalent to perfect expected utility maximizing behavior. 
u 
D 
Game A Game B Game C 
L R L R L R 
9,0 0,1 9,0 0,4 36,0 0,4 
0,1 1,0 0,4 1,0 0,4 4,0 
Table 1. Payoff Tables for Games A-D 
Game D 
L R 
4,0 0,1 
0,1 1,0 
Table 1 presents the games studied in this paper. Game A is the same as a payoff 
matrix recently studied by Ochs (1995) . Games B and C are variations of Game A which 
only involve payoff magnitude changes. In game B, the column player's payoffs of Game 
A are multiplied by a factor of four. In Game C, both the row and column player's 
payoffs of Game A are multiplied by a factor of 4. Game D was included primarily as a 
replication of Ochs (1995) study. 
All four games have unique mixed strategy Nash equilibria. Since Nash equilibria are 
insensitive to positive affine transformations in the payoffs, they are identical for Games 
A, B, and C. Letting p denote the probability the row player chooses U and q denote 
the probability the column player chooses L, these equilibrium probabilities are p* = 0.5 
and q* = 0.1. For Game D, the Nash equilibrium is at p* = 0.5 and q* = 0.2. Thus 
the predictions of Nash equilibrium are easily summarized6: ( i) in all games, the row 
players' choice behavior should be completely random; (ii) in Games A,B, and C, the 
column players should choose L 10% of the time; (iii) In Game D, the column player 
should choose L 203 of the time. 
In contrast with Nash equilibrium, QRE is sensitive to differences in payoff magnitude 
and makes different predictions for the games. Figure 1 represents the QRE as a function 
of,\ for Games A, B, and C, ·while Figure 2 shows the QRE for Games A and D. Here, 
Px = Px (>-) and qx = qx (>-) for XE {A, B, C, D}, denote the probability of choosing U 
and L for any given value of ,\. In each casr, the leftmost points in the graph correspond 
to the randomness predicted by lmv values of .-\, while the probabilities corresponding 
6This actually glosses over a subtle issue of multiple equilibria that arises due to the experimental 
protocol. Consider an experiment with lG subjects (8 row and 8 column), where subjects are randomly 
repaired with a new opponent every time they replay the game. This creates many new equilibria. For 
example, having 4 of the row players always play U and the other 4 row players always play D is not 
inconsistent with equilibrium, since, from the column players' point of view, this is indistinguishable from 
all eight of the players independently randomizing 50/50 between U and D. There are a continuum of 
multiple equilibria of this sort. However, aggregate choice frequencies are the same in all such equilibria. 
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to high values of ,\ are, in the limit, equivalent to the Nash equilibrium prediction. 
The pattern of convergence is very interesting in these games. Specifically, the column 
player's QRE strategy always begins at (. 5, . 5) and converges monotonically to the Nash 
equilibrium. But the row players' QRE strategy actually begins at the Nash equilibrium 
(since it is (. 5, . 5) ) ,  then progressively overplays (relative to Nash equilibrium) the U 
strategy until eventually converging back to (. 5, . 5) .  
The two features that vary across the QRE graphs of the three games are the speed 
with which convergence takes place and huw much the row player overplays U. In Figure 
1, it can be seen that convergence of the QRE to the Nash equilibrium occurs most 
rapidly in Game C, which has the highest payoffs, second most rapidly in Game B, and 
slowest in Game A. Furthermore, the QRE predicts that, for intermediate values of ;\, 
the row player will be overplay strategy U more severely in Games A and C relative to 
. the Nash prediction than in Game B. 
prob 
PA 
2. 2 .00 ,\ 
Figure 1: QRE correspondence for Games A. B, and C 
In our most basic model of homogeneous subjects, we assume that ,\ is exogen·oulsy 
determined, and is identical for all subjects, and identical across games. This yields 
some specific predictions about differences in behavior in these games: For the first three 
games, represented in Figure 1, one can readily see that for any value of;\, this implies 
for the rovv player, . 5  = p* <PB < JJA, and . 5  = p* <PB <Pc, and for the column player 
. 5  > qA > qB > qc > q* = .1. Similarly, for the second subset of games (Game A and 
Game D) represented in Figure 2, we predict for the row player, . 5  = p* <PD < JJA, and 
for the column player \Ve expect . 5  > qv > qA > q* = .1. The experiments of this paper 
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prob 
0.5 
0.3 
0.2 
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PA 
0.11 2. 2 
Figure 2: QRE correspondence for games A and D 
were designed to test these predictions. 
,\ .00 
In order to provide an alternative model of behavior we compare the fit of QRE to 
that of a simple one parameter model, which adds error to the Nash model in a different 
way, similar to the approach of Smith and ·walker (1993). Like the QRE, this model 
also spans a range of behavior for which the Nash equilibrium and the random model 
are the extremes. But instead of embodying an equilibrium restriction like QRE, this 
model simply assumes that players play Nash with probability/ and play randomly with 
probability (1 -1). Therefore, the range of I is the interval [O, 1] and, for a given value of 
/, the equilibrium correspondence is: p = (1 -1) .5 + ( 1)p* and q = (1 -1).5 + ( 1)q*. We 
call this the Noisy Nash Model (NNNI) . It is similar to the QRE model, in the sense that 
when I = 0 the model predicts random play, and for larger values of/, the equilibrium 
approximates the Nash prediction. However, it differs from the QRE in that it is not 
a full equilibrium model. In particular, while subjects choose actions with some error 
(which is equal across actions and is a function of I) the do not take into account the 
fact that other players are also choosing with error. This implies that NNM generally 
makes different predictions from QRE. For example, NNNI predictions do not vary across 
Games A, B, and C, which all have the same unique Nash eqliilibrium. Also, for all games 
NNIVI predicts that the row player always chooses up with probability .5 independent of 
1'· That is, p(/') = .5 for all 1 E [O, l]. 
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3 Experimental Design 
VVe conducted a total of eight experimental sessions on the above games, using as sub­
jects undergraduate and graduate students at the California Institute of Technology with 
little or no formal training in game theory. Each session used twelve subjects, who par­
ticipated in two of the above games. Each game in a session was played 50 times by 
each subject viho was anonymously matched with a subject of the opposite type in each 
period, using a random matching procedure. No two subjects were paired together twice 
in a row, and subjects were fully informed of the matching procedures. The experiments 
were conducted through computers by which subjects were presented with the complete 
payoff matrix and made their choices by clicking on the appropriate row or column with 
a mouse. All subjects could observe, on their computer screen, the full history of actions 
and payoffs for pairings in which they had participated. 
Of the above four games, A, B, and C were played twice with each of the other tvw, 
· once before and once after the other game. Table 2 summarizes the treatments in each 
session. Note that Game D was only played with Game A. For every pair of games 
that was run, we conducted two sessions in order to control for sequencing effects. For 
example, session 1 is an AB session while session 2 is a BA session. 
Session First Game Second Game 
1 A B 
2 B A 
3 B c 
4 c B 
5 A c 
6 c A 
7 A D 
8 D A 
Table 2. First and Second Treatments by Experimental Session 
Before the experiment, each of the 12 subjects was randomly assigned to either the 
row or column position, and these roles did not change for the entire experiment. Par­
ticipants were informed that each unit of payoff represented $0. 10, and that they would 
be paid this amount, in cash, at the encl of the experiment. Prior to the experiment, 
subjects were read instructions7 and guided through four instructional periods, where all 
subjects observed each outcome cell once. 
7The instructions are in the appendix. 
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At the end of the experiment, subjects were privately paid their earnings, in addition 
to a $5.00 participation bonus. Earnings varied substantially by treatment and player 
type. The average earnings for column players were $2.90 for Game A, $11.18 for Game 
B, $11.72 for Game C, and $2.44 for Game D. For the row players, the average earnings 
in each game were $8.17, $8.07, $31.22, and $5.48, respectively, for Games A, B, C, and 
D. The substantially lower payoffs for Games A and D, which were played together only 
in Sessions 7 and 8, led us to omit the announcement of the amount of the participa­
tion bonus until after the experiment in these sessions, at which time the bonus was 
announced to be $10.00 instead of $5.00. 
4 Results 
Table 3 provides a summary of the results for each session, as well as aggregate results 
. for each of the games. At this very high level of aggregation, the effects of varying payoff 
magnitude do not appear to be particularly strong and therefore provide at most weak 
support of the hypotheses. Increasing the column players' payoffs from Game A to Game 
B has little effect on the behavior of those players, but it appears to make the row players 
somewhat less likely to play action U. The latter is predicted by the payoff magnitude 
hypotheses. Increasing the row players payoffs in Game C appears to have the effect of 
decreasing the frequency of the action U and decreasing that of action L.  The latter 
effect is consistent with the hypothesis, but the former one is not. The effects of altering 
payoff magnitude vary within the individual sessions. Finally, notice that for none of 
the games is it the case that the observed behavior corresponds to that predicted by the 
Nash equilibrium. In all games, U and L are overplayed relative to the Nash equilibrium. 
This replicates the findings in Ochs (1995) and is consistent with the predictions of QRE.8 
8 An alternative hypothesis for this observation is that (U, L) is some kind of focal point. \iVhile our 
design is not equipped to reject this hypothesis, it seems unlikely to be an driving force in the data, 
given the absence of a multiple equilibrium problem. 
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Session Game u L n 
1 A 0.680 0.317 300 
B 0.573 0.197 300 
2 B 0.647 0.237 300 
A 0.623 0.243 300 
3 B 0.607 0.363 300 
c 0.570 0.393 300 
4 c 0.623 0.163 300 
B 0.693 0.180 300 
5 A 0.623 0.187 300 
c 0.590 0.197 "300 
6 c 0.593 0.273 300 
A 0.607 0.223 300 
7 A 0.640 0.230 300 
D 0.457 0.313 300 
8 D 0.643 0.343 300 
A 0.683 0.243 300 
Aggregate A 0.643 0.241 1800 
B 0.630 0.244 1200 
c 0.594 0.257 1200 
D 0.550 0.328 600 
Table 3. Experimental Results by Session and Game 
We use a standard x2 test to test the null hypothesis that the observed actions are 
independent of the game being played. The observation that the row players select D 
more frequently in Game C is statistically significant at the 0.01 level in a comparison to 
Game A and at the 0.10 level in a comparison to Game B. Furthermore, the differences 
between Games A and D in the o1)served frequency choices for both players is significant 
at the 0.001 level, which is not surprising for the column player, since the Nash predicted 
frequency of choice L is different between the bvo games.9 This is not true, however, for 
the rnw player's actions, which Nash equilibrium predicts to be the same across the games. 
Table 4 presents the aggregate results for each game, as well as the estimates of A. In 
the tables, p and q represent the observed frequencies of the row player choosing U and 
of the column player choosing L ,  respectiw�ly. l\faximum likelihood estimation was used 
to obtain an estimate of A for these frequencies. The values ALo and AHJ provide a 95% 
confidence interval for this estimate and 13 and q represent the corresponding QRE prob­
abilities. QRE, NASH, and RAND give the log-likelihoods of the maximum likelihood 
90ur reported significance levels assume that observations are i. i. d. Since, as we demonstrate later, 
there are important sources of dependence in the data due to heterog�neity and since there appear to 
be important cohort effects, these levels overstate the statistical significance of these findings. 
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estimator of.\, the Nash equilibrium solution for that game (,\ = oo), and of random 
play ( ,\ = 0), respectively. 
For all four games, a likelihood ratio test rejects, at the 0.001 level, the hypothesis 
that the observed data is consistent with random play (where ,\ = 0 and all strategies 
are played with equal probabilities). Similarly, for all four games, the hypothesis that 
the experimental results are consistent with Nash equilibrium play can be rejected at the 
0.001 level.10 
Game p p c1 q ,\ ALO AHJ QRE NASH RAND 
A 0.690 0.643 0.115 0.241 5.38 4.73 6.25 -2286.1 -2388.7 - 2495.3 
B 0.711 0.630 0.220 0.244 0.75 0.64 0.89 -1478.0 -1602.0 -1663.5 
c 0.635 0.594 0.107 0.257 1.97 1.58 2.63 -1603.8 -1634.9 -1663.5 
D 0.590 0.550 0.210 0.328 7.33 4.41 18.13 -817.3 -822.9 -831.8 
Table 4. Summary of Results and Estimates for all Garnes 
In all four games, subjects in the row position overplayed strategy U relative to the 
Nash equilibrium prediction, particularly in later periods11. At the same time, column 
players overplayed strategy L. Furthermore, in Games A and C the QRE predicts that 
players \Vill over play U more than in the other two games, for intermediate values of 
.\, and we find that this is true for game A, although not to the extent that the model 
predicts. 
Figures 3 through 6 again provide the QRE as a function of ,\ for each of the games, 
aggregated over all data of that experiment. In addition, the experimental frequencies for 
each subset of 10 periods are plotted according to their estimated 12 value of ,\, Periods 
1-10, 11-20, 21-30, 31-40, and 41-50 are represented by 1, 2, 3, 4, and, 5, respectively, 
in the figure. The aggregated data for that game, or periods 1-50, are indicated by the 
number 6. 'Ne find no systematic trends in the estimat�d values of ,\ over time.13 
10If ), represents an exogenously determined measure of precision (or inverse error) in the population, 
then it follows that the estimated values of this parameter should not differ between games. vVe tested 
this assumption by estimating a model in which the parameter is constrained to have the same value 
across games (AA =AB =Ac =AD). \Ve reject the constrained model in favor of the unconstrained 
model. 
11 In fact, given the actual column strategy frequencies, U gives the row player a considerably higher 
expected payoff than L. 
12Each 10-period block was estimated separately. 
13In order to measure whether the parameter A captures any learning that may take place across 
similar games, we recomputed the parameter estimates separately for each game when it was the first 
game played in a session and when it was the second (see Table 2) .. vVe found that for games A, B, 
and D, the estimated parameter values were higher when the game was played second than when it was 
played first. This difference was significant for games B and D. For game C, however, the difference was 
significant and in the opposite direction. This analysis of the data, therefore, provides weak evidence at 
best that values of A are increasing with experience. 
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In these figures, it can again be seen that subjects regularly overplayed U and L 
relative to the Nash equilibrium prediction but that these observed results fit the QRE 
model only slightly better. It is interesting to note that the estimates of A do not register 
at intermediate values of A, especially in games A and C, where the QRE predicts high 
probabilities of U for the row player. 
·while the QRE clearly outperforms both the Nash model and the random model, one 
could argue that these alternatives do not provide a very strong test of the theory, since 
they are extreme points of the QRE correspondence. Therefore, we also test the Noisy 
Nash Model (NNM) discussed above. 
Table 5 presents the aggregate results for each game of the estimation of the NNM. 
For all games, likelihood ratio tests reject both the Nash prediction and random play in 
favor of NNM, at all reasonable significance levels. In addition, for Games A, C, and D, 
. NNM provides a better fit for the data than does the QRE. For Game B, the opposite is 
true, with QRE providing a better fit for the Game B data than does NNld. 
Game p p q q I /LO /HI NNM NASH RAND 
Game A 0.500 0.643 0.240 0.241 0.65 0.60 0.69 -2240.8 -2388.7 -2495.3 
Game B 0.500 0.630 0.244 0.244 0.64 0.58 0.69 -1498.8 -1602.0 -1663.5 
Game C 0.500 0.594 0.256 0.257 0.61 0.55 0.66 -1515.2 -1634.9 -1663.5 
Game D 0.500 0.550 0.329 0.328 0.57 0.45 0.69 -795.7 -822.9 -831.8 
Table 5. Estimates for NN1vI for all Four Games 
Table 6 gives a summary of the various predictions from the QRE theory (additional 
predictions follow from transitivity.) The table indicates which predictions are in the 
correct direction, as well as a z-value for each, ·which would be distributed as unit normal 
under the assumption of independence14. Predictions based on payoff magnitude effects 
are marked (P) . Asterisks next to the corresponding z values indicate which are significant 
at the .05 level. 
For nine of the twelve predictions, the direction is correct, and all but one of those 
would be significant at the .05 level under the assumption of independence. None of the 
four predicted payoff magnitude effects are significant at the .05 level. All other predicted 
effects are significant and have the correct sign. 
It is evident from the above analysis that the hypothesized payoff magnitude effects 
are not borne out in our data. On theoretical grounds, recall that these predictions 
were only valid under the maintained hypothesis that all players have the same A. Such 
heterogeneity would nullify these predictions. Therefore, in the next section we generalize 
14The assumption of independence is not a good one here since the observations consist of multiple 
observations from a single indiYidual, which would tend to be correlated. Correlation would cause the 
z-value to have a larger variance than one. Vle report the z values nevertheless because they are still 
useful in judging the relative orders of magnitude of significance between different rows of the table 
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the QRE model to allow for heterogeneity, to see if this can account for the apparent 
absence of payoff magnitude effects. 
QRE Direction z-
Prediction Actual correct? value 
p* <PB .500 < .630 y 9.001 * 
PB <PA (P) .630 < .643 y . . 726 
PB< Pc (P) .630 > .594 N -1.810 
.5 > qA .500 > .241 y 21.977* 
qA > qB (P) .241 < .244 N -.188 
qB > qc (P) .244 < .257 N -.735 
qc > q* .257 > .100 y 18.129* 
p* <PD .500 < .550 y 2.449* 
PD< PA .550 < .643 y 4.064* 
.5 > qD .500 > .328 y 8.426* 
qD > qA .328 > .241 y 4.193* 
qA > q* .241 > .100 y 19.940* 
Table 6. Summary of QRE predictions versus actual behavior under homogeneity 
5 Heterogeneity 
Examining the individual data, it is apparent that there is s.ome degree of heterogeneity 
within the subject pool. One way to see this is illustrated in Figure 7. In each row of 
this figure, there are two graphs. In the left (right) graph the solid line represents the 
cumulative distribution of the actual frequency of choice of U (L) by the row (column) 
players. Each observation is an individual row (column) player's frequency of choice of 
U (L) over the 50 periods of the experiment. The clotted line represents the cumulative 
distribution of observed histories by the column (row) players of the choice frequencies 
of their opponents. Here, each observation represents the history of choices by that sub­
ject's opponents over the 50 periods of the experiment15. Since the subjects are randomly 
matched \vith a new subject each period, the dotted line represents the sampling distri­
bution that should be observed in the row player frequencies of choice if all row (column) 
players are acting the same. 
Figures 7 shows that in every game, there is more variance in the actual frequen­
cies (solid line) than in the o bservecl, or expected frequencies (dotted line) . Thus, the 
15Since subjects are randomly rematched at the beginning of each period, the acti�ns of the "opponent" 
are really the 50 choices that the players observed. These choices were not made by one player, but 
rather by the six players of the other type, in the order determined by the matching procedure. 
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within subject variance in behavior is less than the total variance, indicating that there 
is between subject variance in behavior. This means that there is heterogeneity in the 
behavior of the individual subjects. If there were no heterogeneity, then there should be 
the same amount of variance across histories as there is across actions of the players. An 
F test for the differences of the variances of the actual versus observed actions shows that 
the difference is significant at the .01 level for all eight cases16. 
The fact that there is larger variance of actions contingent on opponent's choice 
than there is on the opponent's choice itself is a strong indicator of heterogeneity. This 
heterogeneity is also evident when the individual frequencies of responses are compared 
directly. Therefore, it seems that a model which incorporates this variability of actions 
into players' choices in the games may provide a better description of actual behavior. 
J\!Ioreover, if heterogeneity is present, the models in the previous section are misspecified 
_ and hence need to be corrected by estimating a model which explicitly incorporates 
heterogeneity. 
The exact nature of the misspecification problem can also be seen from inspection 
· of the QRE correspondences and from the figures that compare our fitted estimates to 
these correspondences (Figures 3-6). Especially in games A and C, the frequency of U 
choices by row players is never as high as what would be predicted by the QRE given the 
actions of the column players. Furthermore, at the estimated value of ,\, the frequency 
of L by the column players is too high. However, notice that the equilibrium graph of 
the row frequencies is close to .50 for both low and high values of ,\, Thus, if there is 
some variance of ,\, then it is possible that we could recover a lower average estimate of 
,\ (close to the peak of the "UP" curve of the QRE correspondence) and simultaneously 
overcome both the problem of overestimation of U and the problem of underestimation 
of L. 
Figures 8-9 illustrate this point by displaying the QRE for a fixed variance in the 
distribution of /\ across individuals as a function of the mean. These figures correspond 
to Figures 1 and 2, when heterogeneity is introduced into the model. Note that the 
heterogeneity dampens the variation in the QRE, as expected. More importantly, also 
observe that the qualitative predictions about the ordering of the row and column choice 
frequencies across games are no longer valid. In fact, there is very little separation of 
predictions between the various games, which may well explain why we found little sup­
port for these qualitative predictions in the previous section. 
vVith the above goal in mind, we develop and test the following parametric model of 
heterogeneity. In the framework of the QRE model, we allow each player, i, to behave 
according to some a specific value of Ai, and i believes that other subjects are the same. 
These values, however, are allowed to vary between subjects according to a distribution. 
Hence, the previous QRE estimations are a restricted case of this model where the re-
16The F values are, for game A (n = 36): (row) 5.323, (col) 9.340, for game B (n = 24): (row) 11.535, 
(col) 4.623 for game C (n = 24): (row) 15.876, (col) 4.083 and for gam� D (n = 12): (row) 4.567, (col) 
21.194 
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Figure 9: QRE correspondence with heterogeneity for games A and D 
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striction is that the value of A is the same for the entire population. 
As an initial specification of the distribution of Ai in the above model, we decided to 
use a Normal distribution over the values of Log(;\) with mean µ and variance J2P This 
distribution seems appropriate since it is reasonable to believe that a large percentage of 
the subjects' behavior is similar and centered around some mean value of A= eµ. 
In order to find the maximum likelihood estimate of the parameters in this model, 
we conducted a grid search over values of µ and J. For each individual, the likelihood 
L(dij,;\1,,) of that subject's data di was first estimated for eq,ch value of Ak, for k E K, 
·where K is a set of indices, and the Ak were evenly spaced according to the value of 
Log(Ak)· Then, for each k E K, a probability weight 6k(µ, J) for Ak was computed 
according to the CDF of the normal distribution over Log(Ak). The likelihood function 
was computed by first summing across the weighted values of the above likelihoods for all 
values of Log(;\) and then summing across individuals. The following equation represents 
· the log-likelihood calculation which was performed, 
LogL = LL 6k(µ, J)LogL(difAk) 
iEN kEI< 
·where N represents the set of subjects for that game. 
In order to provide a comparison against which to test the heterogeneous QRE with 
heterogeneity model, we also incorporated heterogeneity into the NNM in approximately 
the same way. That is, we incorporated heterogeneity into the error rates of the indi­
viduals. Since the NNivI error parameter, 1, is only defined over the interval [O, 1] we 
parameterized the distribution of r by the Beta distribution with parameters a and /3. 
By searching over the nonnegative range of these parameters, the Beta distribution allows 
for a flexible estimation of 1-heterogeneity. Similar to the QRE heterogeneity model, the 
log-likelihood is computed using the following formula: 
LogL = LL bj(a, /3)L(dilrj) 
iEN jd 
where J is the set of indices of r and 6j is the probability weight (from the Beta distri­
bution) assigned to a particular value of rj. 
The results of the grid searches over values of (µ, J) and (a, /3) are reported for each 
game in Tables 7-10. These estimates produce dramatically different results, compared 
to the homogeneous error models of QRE and NNM. For QRE, comparing the likelihood 
values with those from the estimates without heterogeneity, it is appare1it that this model 
17Using the Log of >. results in a continuous distribution over (-oo, oo) which is necessary for the 
Normal distribution. This modification is necessary since>. is only specified in the interval [O,oo). 
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does a much better job of accurately predicting play, and this improvement is significant 
for all four games, at any conventional level of significance� The improvement in fit is 
somewhat less for NNM, but still significant for all games. More importantly, the relative 
performance of NNM and QRE are reversed. While NNI\!I provided a slightly better fit 
than QRE for some of the games under the (incorrect) hypothesis of homogeneity, the 
heterogeneous. QRE model fits all the data much better than the heterogeneous NNl\!I 
model. For all games, the log-likelihood values reported are higher for the QRE model 
with heterogeneity than for the heterogeneity NNM model. In fact, a more detailed 
analysis (not reported in the tables here) confirms that this is true for every 10-period 
subsample. 
JvJODEL ft p (j q µ >. = eµ (]" o; {3 -Log(L) 
QRE 0.682 0. 643 0.208 0.241 1.50 4.48 2.2 2012.7 
NNM 0.500 0.643 0.215 0.241 1. 15 0.50 2164.9 
Table 7. Estimates for QRE and NN:M Heterogeneity Model for Game A 
1\10DEL p p q q µ >. = eµ (]" o; {3 -Log(L) 
QRE 0.611 0.630 0.228 0.244 0.30 1.35 2.0 1367.8 
NNM 0.500 0.630 0.230 0.244 1.05 0.50 1449.8 
Table 8. Estimates for QRE and NNrd Heterogeneity Model for Game B 
1\JODEL p p q q µ >. = eµ (]" o; {3 -Log(L) 
QRE 0.637 0. 594 0.239 0.257 0.10 1.12 3.6 1351.2 
NNI\!I 0.500 0.594 0.230 0.257 0.65 0.30 1451.0 
Table 9. Estimates for QRE and NNfl1I Heterogeneity Model for Game C 
A10DEL p p (j q µ >. = eµ (]" o; {3 -Log(L) 
QRE 0.555 0.550 0.320 0.328 2. 40 11.02 6.0 724.8 
NNM 0.500 0.550 0.350 0. 328 1.00 0.01 756.7 
Table 10. Estimates for QRE and NNM Heterogeneity Node! for Game D 
The most apparent source of the relative lack of improvement of the NNM fit with 
heterogeneity is that NNM ahvays predicts the row player will play Up with probability 
equal to 0.5, for all values of (a, {3). Thus heterogeneity in NNJ\II can only improve the 
fit to column player data. But introducing heterogeneity in.to the QRE model reduces 
the extent to 1vhich this model predicts overplaying of U by the row player relative to 
the experimental results. 
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Recall that earlier we looked at whether or not the value of A increased during an 
experiment, and found no consistent trends. An interesting question to raise, then, is 
whether the values of µ in the QRE heterogeneity model are increasing across periods. 
This would again provide a weak test of our hypothesis that the parameter of A in the 
QRE is a measure of learning. If the value of µ increases during the experiments, it can 
be interpreted as evidence of population learning. The results of a test of this hypoth­
esis, however, are again inconclusive. While Kendall rank-order correlation coefficients 
are positive for Games A, B, and C (respectively, 0.60, 0.95, and 0.20) and significant at 
p < 0.05 for Game B, the coefficient for Game D is negative (-0.67). The same is true 
for Spearman rank-order coefficients. 
·6 Conclusion 
. This paper provided a test of alternative equilibrium notions for a set of 2 x 2 games 
with unique mixed strategy equilibria. The results indicate that the heterogeneous error 
Quantal Response Equilibrium provides the best fit to actual play in these games, com­
pared to Nash equilibrium, random play, and the Noisy Nash t-.fodel. These results are 
supported in tests for all games. However, the data do not always fit the QRE well, since 
the model generally overpredicts the frequency with which the row player will choose U. 
The predictive ability of both QRE and NNM is greatly improved, however, by the in­
troduction of heterogeneity into these models. We model heterogeneity as a distribution 
over the parameters (.A or 1) in a population. In the QRE model, heterogeneity means 
that each player has their own value for A and behaves as if this value represents the 
parameter for the entire population. The set of these Ai is represented by a distribution 
N(µ, CT2 ) over the space of Log(.A) . A similar construction is done for the NNM using the 
Beta distribution with parameters a and {3. 
vVe also tested whether payoff magnitudes cause significant effects, as predicted by 
the homogeneous version of QRE if A is constant across the games being played. This 
hypothesis is rejected in comparisons between unconstrained estimation of the parameter 
and constrained estimation, where the parameter is held the same across all the games. 
The additional hypothesis that the parameter A represents a measure of learning which 
increases with play of a game, or exposure to a similar game, also finds little support 
when comparisons are made between sessions where a game is played first and sessions 
where it is played second. Both of these results indicate that it would be desirable to 
try to endogenize A and to develop a model of how /\ changes as players gain experience. 
This is beyond the scope of the current paper, but McKelvey, Palfrey, and Weber (1997) 
pursues the first of these two extensions. 
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Summarizing, our results indicate that, while play differs considerably in these Nash­
equivalent games, the differences can be explained somewhat well by a model which 
introduces both error and heterogeneity within this error. 
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APPENDIX 23 
INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in decision making, and you will be paid for your participation in 
cash. Different subjects may earn different amounts. What you earn depends partly on your 
decisions and partly on the decisions of others. 
The entire experiment will take place through computer terminals, and all interaction 
between subjects will take place through the computers. It is important that you not talk or in 
any way try to communicate with other subjects during the experiment. If you disobey the rules, 
we will have to ask you to leave the experiment. 
We will start with a brief instruction period. During the instruction period, you will be 
given a complete description of the experiment and will be shown how to use the computers. If 
you have any questions during the instruction period, raise your hand and your question will be 
answered so everyone can hear. If any difficulties arise after the experiment has begun, raise 
your hand, and an experimenter will come and assist you. 
The subjects will be divided into two groups, each containing an equal number of 
subjects. The groups will be labeled the RED group and the BLUE group . .To determine which 
color you are, will you each please select an envelope as the experimenter passes by you. 
[EXPERIMENTER PASS our ENVELOPES] 
Inside each envelope is an index card labeled either BLUE or RED. If you chose BLUE, 
you will be BLUE for the entire experiment. If you chose RED, you will be RED for the entire 
experiment. Please remember your color, because the instructions are slightly different for the 
BLUE and RED subjects. 
This experiment will consist of two sessions, Session A and Session B. Each session will 
consist of several periods or matches. I will now describe what occurs in each match. First, you 
will be randomly paired with a subject of the opposite color. Thus, if you are a BLUE subject, 
you will be paired with a RED subject. If you are a RED subject, you will be paired with a 
BLUE subject 
[TURN ON OVERHEAD PROJECTOR] 
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After you have been paired, each subject will simultaneously be asked to make a choice. 
The RED subject in each pair will be asked to choose one of the two rows in the matrix which 
will appear on the computer screen and which is also now shown on the screen at the front of the 
room. The RED subject can choose either "Up" or "Down". The BLUE subject in each pair will 
be asked to choose one of the two columns in the matrix, either "Left" or "Right". Neither 
subject will be informed of what choice the other subject has made until after all choices have 
been made. 
After each subject has made his or her choice, payoffs for the match are determined based 
on the choices made. Payoffs to each subject are indicated by the numbers in the matrix. The 
payoff to the RED subject is in red and appears in the lower left of each compartment, while the 
payoff to the BLUE subject is in blue and appears in the upper right of each compartment. The 
units are in dimes. 
Thus, if the RED subject chooses ''Up" and the BLUE subject chooses "Left" the RED 
subject receives a payoff of __ dimes while the BLUE subject receives a payoff of __ 
dimes. If the RED subject chooses "Up" and the BLUE subject chooses "Right'', the RED 
subject receives a payoff of __ dimes while the BLUE subject receives a payoff of __ 
dimes. If the RED subject chooses "Down" and the BLUE subject chooses "Left", the RED 
subject receives a payoff of __ dimes while the BLUE subject receives a payoff of __ 
dimes. Lastly, if the RED subject chooses "Down" and the BLUE subject chooses "Right'', the 
RED subject receives a payoff of __ dimes while the BLUE subject receives a payoff of __ 
dimes. 
This process will be repeated for two sessions of __ matches each. Every match you 
will be randomly paired with a new subject. You are equally likely to be paired with each 
subject of the opposite color, however you will never be paired with the same subject twice in a 
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row. For example, if  you are a RED subject, and in match # 1  you were paired with BLUE 
subject #5 , then in match #2 you may be paired with any other BLUE subject except BLUE 
subject #5. The identity of the person you are paired with will never be revealed to you. 
Your final earnings for the experiment will be the sum of your payoffs from all __ 
matches plus a ___ participation bonus. 
[BEGIN COMPUI'ER INSTRUCTION SESSION] 
We will now begin the computer instruction session. Will all RED subjects please move 
to the computers to my left, near the window, and will all BLUE subjects please move to the 
computers to my right, near the door to the hallway. 
[W All' FOR SUBJECTS TO MOVE TO APPROPRIATE COMPUI'ERS] 
[TURN OFF OVERHEAD PROJECTOR] 
During the computer instruction session, we will teach you how to use the computer by 
going through a few practice matches. Do not hit any keys until you are told to do so, and when 
you are told to enter information, type exactly what you are told to type. You are not paid for 
these practice matches. 
Please turn on your computer now by pushing the button labeled "MASTER" on the right 
hand side of the panel underneath the screen. 
{WAIT FOR S UBJECTS TO TURN ON COMPUI'ER] 
When the computer prompts you for your name, type your full name. Then hit the 
ENTER key. Confirm your entry by pressing the Y key when prompted, or press the N key to 
correct your entry. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO ENTER NAMES] 
When you are asked to enter your color, type R if your color is RED, and B if your color 
is BLUE. Then hit ENTER. Confirm your entry by pressing the Y key when prompted, or press 
the N key to correct your entry. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO ENTER COLORS] 
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You now see the experiment screen. Throughout the experiment, you will be told what is 
currently happening at the left or very bottom of the screen. The strip along the bottom of the 
screen tells the history of what happened in your previous matches. Since the experiment has not 
yet begun, this strip along the bottom is currently empty. In the middle of the screen is the 
matrix which you have previously seen up on the screen at the front of the room. At the top left 
of the screen you see your color, your subject ID number, and·your name. Is there anyone whose 
color is not correct? 
[WAIT FOR RESPONSE] 
We will now pass out the experiment record sheet, on which you will record all of the 
results from this experiment. When you receive an experiment record sheet, please record your 
name, color, and today's date on the top of the sheet. Do D.Q1 record your subject ID number at 
this time. 
[EXPERIMENTER PASS OUT EXPERIMENT RECORD SHEETS AND PENCILS] 
[W AlT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD INFORMATION] 
We will now start the first practice match. Remember, do not hit any keys or click the 
mouse button until you are told to do so. 
If you are ·a RED subject, on the left of the screen you are asked to please choose a row. 
If you are a BLUE subject, you are asked to please choose a column. You will choose a row or 
column by moving the mouse to the appropriate choice and clicking the mouse button. 
Will all RED subjects now move the mouse so that the arrow on the screen is pointing to 
the bottom row labeled "D" and will all BLUE subjects now move the mouse so that the arrow 
on the screen is pointing to the left column labeled "L". 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO MOVE MOUSE TO APPROPRIATE ROW OR COLUMN] 
Note that the row or column to which you are pointing with the mouse is now surrounded 
by a flashing rectangle. Will all RED subjects please choose "Down" and all BLUE subjects 
please choose "Left" by clicking the mouse button now while the arrow is pointing to the 
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appropriate row or column. After choosing the row or column, confirm your choice by clicking 
on the "Yes" icon at the bottom of the screen or click on the "No" icon to correct your choice. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO CHOOSE ROW OR COLUMN AND CONFIRM THE CHOICE] 
After all subjects have confirmed their choices, the match is over. The outcome of this 
match, Down-Left, is now highlighted on everybody' s  screen. Also note that the moves and 
payoffs of the match are recorded in the experiment history at the bottom of the screen. The 
outcomes of all of your previous matches will be recorded at the bottom of the screen throughout 
the experiment so that you can refer back to previous outcomes whenever you like. The payoff 
to the RED subject for this match is __ and the payoff to the BLUE subject is __ . Please 
record the outcome of this match on your experiment record sheet in the first row labeled 
�'PRACTICE". After you have finished recording the outcome of this match, use the mouse to 
click on the "OK" icon at the bottom of the screen to indicate that you are ready to continue. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD OUTCOME AND CUCK "OK"] 
You are not being paid for the practice session, but if this were the real experiment, then 
the payoff you have recorded would be money you have earned from the first match, and you 
would be p aid this amount for that match at the end of the experiment. The total you earn over 
all __ real matches, in addition to the bonus, is what you will be paid for your 
participation in the experiment. 
We will now proceed to the second practice match. 
[EX.PER/MENTER HIT KEY TO START SECOND MATCH] 
For the second match, each subject has been randoIDiy paired with a different subject of 
the opposite color. You are D..Q1 paired with the same subject you were paired with in the first 
match. The rules for the second match are exactly like the first. Will all RED subjects again 
choose "Down" by clicking on the bottom row and confirming the choice. Also, will all BLUE 
subjects choose "Right" by clicking on the right column and confirming the choice. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO CHOOSE ROW OR COLUMN AND CONFIRM CHOICE] 
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The outcome o f  this match, Down-Right, i s  now highligh ted on everybody's screen. The 
payoff to the RED subject for this match is __ and the payoff to the BLUE subject is __ . 
Please record the outcome of this match on your experiment record sheet in the second row 
labeled "PRACTICE". After you have finished recording the outcome of this match, use the 
mouse to click on the "OK" icon at the bottom of the screen to indicate that you are ready to 
continue. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD OUTCOME AND' CUCK "OK"] 
We will now proceed to the third practice match. 
[EXPERIMENTER HIT KEY TO START THIRD MATCH] 
Will all RED subjects choose "Up" by clicking on the top row and confirming the choice, 
and will all BLUE subjects choose "Left" by clicking on the left column and confirming the 
choice. 
[WAIT FOR S UBJECTS TO CHOOSE ROW OR COLUMN AND CONFIRM CHOICE] 
The outcome of this match is now highlighted on everybody's screen. The payoff to the 
RED subject for this match is __ and the payoff to the BLUE subject is __ . Please record 
the outcome of this match on your experiment record sheet in the third row labeled 
"PRACTICE''. After you have finished recording the outcome of this match, use the mouse to 
click on the "OK" icon at the bottom of the screen to indicate that you are ready to continue. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD OUTCOME AND CUCK "OK"] 
We will now proceed to the fourth practice match. 
[EXPERIMENTER HIT KEY TO START FOURTH MATCH] 
Will all RED subjects choose "Up" by clicking on the top row and confirming the choice, 
and will all BLUE subjects choose "Right" by clicking on the right column and confirming the 
choice. 
[WAIT FOR S UBJECTS TO CHOOSE ROW OR COLUMN AND CONFIRM THE CHOICE] 
The outcome of this match is now highlighted on everybody's screen. The payoff to the 
RED subject for this match is __ and the payoff to the BLUE subject is __ . Please record 
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the outcome of this match on your experiment record sheet in the fourth row labeled 
"PRACTICE". After you have finished recording the outcome of this match, use the mouse to 
click on the "OK" icon at the bottom of the screen to indicate that you are ready to continue. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD OUTCOME AND CllCK "OK" ] 
[EXPERIMENTER HIT KEY TO END PRACTICE SESSION] 
This concludes the practice matches. The computer screen now indicates your total 
payoff for the four practice matches. This is the amount you would have earned for these 
matches if these were matches in the actual experiment You do not need to record this total. 
In the actual experiment there will be two sessions, Session A and Session B ,  of __ 
matches each, and, of course, it will be up to you to make your own decisions. At the end of the 
Session B, the experiment ends and we will pay each of you privately, in cash, the total amount 
you have accumulated during all __ matches, plus your guaranteed __ participation bonus. 
No other person will be told how much cash you earned in the experiment. You need not tell any 
other participants how much you earned. 
Are there any questions before we begin Session A? 
[EXPERIMENTER TAKE QUESTIONS] 
O.K., then we will now begin with the actual experiment and Session A. Please press the 
spacebar once and wait a moment for the current screen to clear. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO PRESS SPACEBAR AND CLEAR SCREEN] 
After the screen has changed, please type "DL" and hit the "Enter" Key. 
[EXPERIMENTER START EXPERIMENT PROGRAM] 
If there are any problems from this point on, raise your hand and an experimenter will come and 
assist you. When the computer asks for your name, please start as before by typing your name. 
Wait for the computer to ask for your color, then respond with the correct color. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO INPUT NAME AND COLOR] 
[EXPERIMENTER HIT KEY TO START MATCHING] 
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At the top left of your screen you once again see your color and subject ID number. This 
ID number may be different than the ID number you were given during the practice matches. 
Will you now please record this ID number at the top of your experiment record sheet where it 
says "Subject ID#, Session A". Also, please make sure that the color indicated on the screen is 
correct. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD ID NUMBERS] 
Okay, we will now begin Session A. 
[START EXPERIMENT] 
[AFTER JST MATCH, REMIND SUBJECTS THEY ARE PAIRED WITH A NEW PERSON] 
2X2 EXPERJMENT 
INTER-SESSION INSTRUCTIONS 
[AFTER MATCH #_, EXPERIMENTER TERMINATE EXPERIMENT] 
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Session A is now completed. Please record your total payoff for Session A by adding up 
all your payoffs for matches 1 through __ and writing this total at the bottom of your 
experiment record sheet where it says "Session A Total". Make sure that you do lliU include 
your payoffs from the practice sessions when adding up your payoffs. Your total payoff should 
match the total that is indicated on the computer screen. If there are any problems, please raise 
your hand. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO COMPUTE THEIR SESSION A TOTAL] 
[TURN ON OVERHEAD PROJECTOR WITH NEW MATRIX] 
In a minute we will begin Session B .  During Session B ,  all the rules will be the same, 
however the payoffs for each match will change slightly. In Session B ,  if the RED subject 
chooses "Up" and the BLUE subject chooses "Left" the RED subject receives a payoff of __ 
dimes and the BLUE subject receives a payoff of __ dimes. If the RED subject chooses "Up" 
and the BLUE subject chooses "Right", the RED subject now receives a payoff of __ dimes 
and the BLUE subject receives a payoff of __ dimes. If the RED subject chooses "Down" and 
the BLUE subject chooses "Left" the RED subject receives a payoff of __ dimes and the 
BLUE subject receives a payoff of __ dimes. Lastly, if the RED subject chooses "Down" and 
the BLUE subject chooses "Right" the RED subject receives a payoff of __ dimes and the 
BLUE subject receives a payoff of __ dimes. 
Are there any questions before we begin Session B ?  
[EXPERJMENTER TAKE QUESTIONS] 
O.K., then we will now begin Session B.  Please press the spacebar once and wait a 
moment for the current screen to clear. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO PRESS SPACEBAR AND CLEAR SCREEN] 
After the screen has changed, please type "DL" and hit the "Enter" Key. 
[EXPERIMENTER START EXPERIMENT PROGRAM] 
[TURN OFF OVERHEAD PROJECTOR] 
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When the computer asks for your name, please start as before by typing your name. Wait 
for the computer to ask for your color, then respond with the correct color. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO INPUT NAME AND COWR] 
[EXPERIMENTER HIT KEY TO START MATCHING] 
At the top left of your screen you once again see your color and subject ID number. This 
ID number may be different than the ID number you were given previously. Will you now 
please record this ID number at the top of your experiment record sheet where it says "Subject 
ID#, Session B". Also, please make sure that the color indicated on the screen is correct. 
[WAIT FOR SUBJECTS TO RECORD ID NUMBERS] 
Okay, we will now begin Session B. 
[START EX.PERIMENI'] 
[AFTER JST MATCH, REMIND SUBJECTS THEY ARE PAIRED WITH A NEW PERSON] 
l 
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FINAL INSTRUCTIONS 
The experiment is now completed. Please record your total payoff for Session B by adding up 
all your payoffs for matches 1 through __ and writing this total at the bottom of your experiment 
record sheet where it says "Session B Total". Your total payoff for Session B should match the total that 
is indicated on the computer screen. 
After you have calculated this payoff, add together your Session A total, Session B total, and the 
__ participation bonus to get your final payoff for the experiment. Remember that the payoff units 
are m  __ _ 
Also, at the bottom of the last page of your record sheet you are asked to write your name, social 
security number, amount received, and your signature. You may write your name and social security 
number now, however please wait until after you have received payment to write the amount received 
and your signature. If there are any problems or questions, please raise your hand. 
After you are done calculating your payoff for the experiment. please remain seated. You will be 
paid in the office at the back of the room one at a time. 
Please take a look at the index card labeled "BLUE" or "RED" which you received at the 
beginning of the experiment. The number in the bottom right-hand comer of this card will determine the 
order in which you will be paid. When we call your number, it is your turn to receive payment. 
Please bring all your things with you when you go to the back office. You can leave the 
experiment through the back door of the office. 
Please refrain from discussing this experiment while you are waiting to receive payment so that 
privacy regarding individual choices and payoffs may be maintained. While you are waiting I will come 
by to gather experiment materials. When you are done calculating your payoff for the experiment, you 
may tum off your computer by pushing the button labeled "MASTER" on the right hand side of the 
panel underneath the screen. 
Whenever the person with the index card labeled number one is ready, he or she may now go to 
the back office to receive payment. 
Thank you all very much for participating in this experiment. 
